The Splintered Mind
Eric Schwitzgebel
Reflections in philosophy of psychology, broadly construed. Blog by Eric Schwitzgebel, American professor of philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. His main interests include connections between empirical psychology, philosophy of mind, and the nature of belief, as well as Classical Chinese philosophy.
August 2026
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All posts (51)
Available here. Abstract: Future AI persons might both (1.) deserve moral consideration and rights fully equal with natural human persons, and (2.) have lifeways so radically different from ours as to break familiar patterns of moral thinking by violating our ordinary background assumptions. This article presents a...
Biological naturalists (e.g., Godfrey-Smith, Block, Searle, Seth) suggest that computers aren't made of the right kind of stuff to be conscious. Consciousness, they suggest, requires a biological substrate that computers lack. It's not always clear, however, exactly what property animal biologies have that computers...
... but collectively, we haven't yet figured out how. Yet! Helen De Cruz and the 2+1 Experiment The inspired advocacy of the late (dearly missed) Helen De Cruz convinced the American Philosophical Association to try out what they called the "2+1" model for their three annual conferences: two in-person, one remote,...
Liberals about AI consciousness hold that we might soon (if we haven't already) create genuinely conscious AI systems. Conservatives about AI consciousness hold that AI consciousness remains in the distant future if it's possible at all. According to the Leapfrog Hypothesis, the first conscious AI will not have...
Given the surge of interest in AI consciousness, the issue of "substrate independence" or "substrate flexibility" is now a hot topic in the metaphysics of mind. That is, does being conscious require having a particular material composition? Or can anything with the right type of functional structure and behavioral...
Part Two of a two-part seriesby Grace Helton (guest blogger) [Joan Miro, The Garden, 1925; image source] In the first part of this 2-part series, I argued that relationships between humans and large language models (LLMs) do not qualify as friendships, even when the humans in those relationships are passionately...
Part One of a two-part seriesby Grace Helton (guest blogger)[Paul Klee, Angel Applicant, 1939; source]Some people have come to interact with ChatGPT as though it were a kind of friend or romantic partner. For instance, a 2025 New York Times article describes the case of Ayrin, a human who fell in love with her...
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